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THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
OF THE MAYAGUEZ INCIDENT
By MichaelF. Kelley*

Introduction
On May 12, 1975, gunboats from the communist regime which
had assumed power the month before in Cambodia seized the United
States merchant ship Mayaguez. Within the next few days President
Ford reacted to this provocation by ordering the United States Navy and
Marine Corps to attack Cambodian targets in the Gulf of Thailand as
well as on the Cambodian mainland. This note discusses the constitutionality of the presidential response to the seizure. The author takes
the position that the military retaliation ordered by President Ford
transcended his constitutional and statutory war-making authority because Congress at no time authorized his course of action.
Part I of this note presents the views of the framers of the Constitution as to the allocation of war powers between Congress and the
president by analyzing the debates at the Constitutional Convention and
those at the subsequent state ratifying conventions. Part II contrasts the
modem argument for adaption by usage, an argument used to support
the assumption of virtually unlimited war-making power by latter-day
presidents, with the relevant judicial interpretation of the war powers
language of the Constitution. Part IIl analyzes the War Powers Resolution of 1973 in an effort to determine the limitations of this statute and
its probable effect on the future use of American military force around
the world. The final section, Part IV, considers the Mayaguez affair as
the most recent example of presidential usurpation of congressional war
power and the corresponding, though lamentable, tendency of recent
Congresses to acquiesce in this process. The note concludes with a call
for Congress to reassume its constitutionally mandated responsibility to
decide between war and peace, and emphasizes that the potential of a
nuclear holocaust demands that Congress reassert itself in this area.
*
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I. The Framers' Understanding of the Constitutional Delineation of the Power to Commit the Nation to War
Unlike the express limitation placed on state war-making by the
federal Constitution,' language dividing the war-making powers between the president 2 and Congress 3 does not explicitly deny these powers to one branch or the other. Nor is this ambiguity completely
resolved by the record of the debates .at the Constitutional Convention,
because the question of the division of the war powers between the three
branches of the federal government was apparently not deemed worthy
of extended debate. 4 The documentation available-James Madison's
notes on the debate of August 17, 1787, where the clause of the draft
constitution giving Congress the power "to make war" 5 was weighed
against an amendment offered by Madison and Elbridge Gerry6 -indicates a general objection to a national war power that could be exercised without serious reflection:
Mr. Pinkney opposed the vesting of this power in the Legislature. Its proceedings were too slow. It wd. meet but once a year.
The Hs of Reps would be too numerous for such deliberations.
The Senate would be the best depository ....
Mr. Butler . . .was for vesting the power in the President,
who will have all the requisite qualities, and will not make war but
when the Nation will support it.
Mr. M[adison] and Mr. Gerry moved to insert "declare"
striking out "make" war; leaving to the Executive the power to
repel sudden attacks.
Mr. Sherman thought "to make war" stood very well. The
Executive shd. be able to repel and not to commence war.
"Make" better than "declare" the latter narrowing the power too
much.
Mr. Gerry never expected to hear in a republic a motion to
empower the Executive alone to declare war.
1. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 10, cl. 3: "No state shall, without the Consent of Congress . . . engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will
not admit of delay."
2. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cI. 1: "The President shall be Commander in Chief
of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States,
when called into the actual service of the United States. . ....
3. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, el. 11: "Tfhe Congress shall have power) To declare
War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on
Land and Water."
4. See 2 THE REcoans OF THE FEDERAL CONvENFTON OF 1787, at 318-19 (M. Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937) [hereinafter cited as FARaAND]. The principal report on the
one debate, that of August 17, 1787, explicitly discussing the allocation of the war-making powers is little more than a page long.
5. Id. at 182.
6. Id. at 318-19. This amendment substituted the wording "to declare" for "to
make" war.
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Mr. Mason was agst. giving the power of war to the Executive,
because not (safely) to be trusted with it; or to the Senate, because
not so constructed as to be entitled to it. He was for clogging
rather than facilitating war;
but for facilitating peace. He preferred "declare" to "make."17
Madison's journal shows that the question on the amendment was
called again after it failed to pass on a four to five vote., The second
tally was originally seven in favor of the amendment with two opposed,
but Robert Elseworth of Connecticut changed his vote to aye when he
was told that the word "make" would be understood as giving Congress
the power to "conduct" a war already instituted, which power the
Constituion had already vested in the executive. 9 Since no other explanation can be found to account for the shift from rejection to acceptance, it is likely that the amendment was intended merely to express the
consensus that Congress would be denied the power to decide strategy
and tactics in a war it had previuosly declared.
The constitutional scholar Raoul Berger concludes from the quoted
passage that:
Viewed against repudiation of royal prerogative, no more can
be distilled from the Madison-Gerry remark than a limited grant
to the President of power to repel attack when, as the very terms
"sudden attack" imply, there could be no time to consult with Congress. Despite the fact, therefore, that the replaced "make" is a
verbal component of "war-making," the shift to "declare" did not
remove the great bulk of the war-making powers from Congress; it
merely removed the power to conduct a war once declared. ....10

Another scholar, the historian Charles Lofgren, reaches essentially
the same conclusion on the strength of other evidence. Noting that the
draft constitution reported by the Committee on Detail on August 611
agreed in all essentials with earlier draft constitutions submitted by
Edmund Randolph,' 2 he states:
Clearly, as the committee sensed the will of the Convention on
these points-points which, it must be remembered, had scarcely
been debated-war-making fell almost automatically to Congress.
At the same time, the committee made the executive, now denominated the President, the Commander in Chief of the armed forces.
In view of the concurrent grant to Congress of the broad power
"to make war," the Presidency did not carry with it any authority
7. Id.
8. Id. at 314.
9. Id. at 319 n.10.
10. Berger, War-Making By the President, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 29, 41 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Berger].
11. 2 FARRAND, supranote 4, at 181-82.
12. Id. at 142-44.

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 3

to initiate war, except perhaps the restricted power of repelling sudden attacks .... 13
In contrast to the August 17th debate settling Congress' power as
one "to declare war,"'14 the commander in chief clause15 was passed
without recorded debate or amendment on August 27, 1787.16 Coupled
with the convention's understanding of Congress' war powers, "[t]his
expeditious, unremarked assent," Lofgren asserts, "again suggests a
narrow, non-controversial conception of the clause."' 7
The preponderance of evidence from the state ratification debates
further suggests that the delegates to the Constitutional Convention in
defending their product before their constituencies thought of presidential war-making in exceptionally narrow terms. At least one commentator" is inclined toward the view that the power "to declare war" given to
Congress by the Constitution was practically identical to the "sole and
exclusive right and power of determining on peace and war" given to
Congress by the former Articles of Confederation.19 The clause "declare war" generated so little controversy that the only attempted
amen.dment was to require a two-thirds vote in each House for a
declaration of war.20
Countering any possible charge that the new Constitution diminished the war-making powers of Congress, Robert R. Livingston of New
York argued that its powers were the "very same" as those of Congress
under the old Confederation: "Congress have the power of making war
and peace, of levying money and raising men; they may involve us in a
war at their pleasure . ... ,, James Wilson of Pennsylvania,22 although recognizing that the young nation was an inviting target for
European military adventures, and that the new nation required a
coordinated national defense, abhorred the prospect of a concentration
of war-making powers in the Executive:
13.
81 YALE
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding,
LJ.672, 679 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Lofgren].
See text accompanying notes 6-7 supra.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
2 FARRAND, supra note 4, at 426-28.
Lofgren, supra note 13, at 679.
Id. at 684-85.
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. IX in 1 DEBATES IN THE SEvERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 81 (J.
Elliot ed., 1836)
[hereinafter cited as ELLIOT, DEBATES].
20. 2 ELLIOT, DEBATES, supra note 19, at 407. The amendment was offered by
Thomas Tredwell at the New York Ratifying Convention. The record does not indicate
whether this question ever came to a vote.
21. Id. at 278.
22. Wilson was appointed as one of the first justices of the Supreme Court of the
United States in 1789.
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I do not mean that, with an efficient government, we should
This system will not
mix with the commotions of Europe ....
hurry us into war; it is calculated to guard against it. It will not
be in the power of a single man, or a single body of men, to involve
us in such distress; for the important power of declaring war is

vested in the legislature at large . . . from this circumstance we

may draw a certain conclusion
that nothing but our national inter23
est can draw us into a war.
James Iredell,2 4 speaking before the North Carolina Ratifying Convention, was even more explicit as to the necessity of separating executive from legislative power in this area. He observed the material
distinction between the war powers of the king of Great Britain and
those of the president under our Constitution. The king was not only
the commander in chief of his army and navy, but he also had the
authority to commit Great Britain to war. In the United States, on the
other -hand, the power of declaring2 5war was exclusively vested in the
Senate and House of Representatives.
Finally, Alexander Hamilton, often regarded as the great exponent
of an expansive presidential prerogative, echoed Iredell's understanding
of the war-making powers of the national executive when he defended
the new Constitution against objections of its New York critics that the
president could assume quasi-regal power:
[T]he President is to be Commander in Chief of the army and
navy of the United States. In this respect his authority would be
nominally the same with that of the King of Great-Britain, but in
substance much inferior to it. It would amount to nothing more
than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval
forces, as first General and Admiral of the confederacy; while that
of the British King extends to the declaringof war and to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies; all which by the Constitution under consideration would appertain to the Legislature.2 6
Admittedly hostilities without declaration of war were common
during the eighteenth century, 7 as they have been in the twentieth.
All the same, does the Constitution leave the waging of an undeclared war unaccounted for, or does it impliedly vest this power in
the president? In view of the rejection of the British model, 2 8 and the
comparison of the war powers of Congress under the Constitution with
those of the Congress under the Articles of Confederation2 9 both alter23. 2 ELLIOT, DEBATES, supra note 19, at 528.
24. Iredell was appointed associate justice of the United States Supreme Court in
1790.
25. 4 ELLIOT, DEBATES, supra note 19, at 107-08.
26. THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 465 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).
27. See J. MAURICE, HOSTILITIES WrrHoUT DECLARATION OF WAR 1700-1870, at 1226 (1883).
28. See text accompanying notes 24-26 supra.
29. See text accompanying notes 18-23 supra.
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natives seem unlikely. However, we need not rely on inference alone.
Analysis of the delegation to Congress of the power "To . . . grant
Letters of Marque and Reprisal," 30 leads to the conclusion that the new
Congress' power "to declare war" was to be understood not in the
narrow, technical sense of ratification of military action previously
initiated by the president, but was to encompass the authority to initiate
all hostilities.
Letters of marque and reprisal were the means by which European
states authorized a private individual to pursue an enemy and seize his
person or property, wherever he might be found. 31 While the practice
of granting letters for the satisfaction of purely personal claims had all
but disappeared by the time of the Convention of 1787, nations continued to press their own claims by means of both public naval forces and
private ships authorized to act under privateer commissions or letters of
marque and reprisal.3 2 Noting that European state reprisals commonly
resulted in outright war, Lofgren argues that:
The clause thus could easily have been interpreted as serving
as a kind of shorthand for vesting in Congress the power of general
[i.e., "state"] reprisal outside the context of declared war. For
someone in the late 1780's, this interpretation . . . in turn would
have given increased plausibility to the view that Congress possessed whatever war-commencing
power was not covered by the
33
phrase "to declare war."
Lofgren's analysis of the "Letters of Marque and Reprisal" clause
effectively refutes the argument that the congressional power to declare
war merely gives Congress an opportunity to ratify an already accomplished condition of war-to grace a state of de facto belligerency with
its official blessing. The grant to Congress of the powers "To declare
War" and "grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal" was almost certainly
understood by the members of the adopting and ratifying conventions to
vest in the legislative branch complete authority to start our nation on
the road to war, however broadly or narrowly this term was to be
defined. With the exception of a limited power to meet sudden attacks
on the United States,34 the president was to have no greater authority
than to exercise military command once hostilities had been initiated."
30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
31. Lofgren, supranote 13, at 693.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 696-97 (footnote omitted).
34. See the remarks of Roger Sherman, James Madison, and Elbridge Gerry in the
text accompanying note 7 supra.
35. See text accompanying notes 25-26 supra; see Hearingson War Powers Before
the Subcomm. on National Se~urity Policy and Scientific Developments of the House
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., at 189-90 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Hearingson War Powers]:
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H. Subsequent Interpretation of the
War Powers Clause
A. The Argument for Adaption by Usage

The framers of our Constitution were men of experience who knew
that emergencies would arise from -time to time in the affairs of the
Republic. The Mayaguez seizure was just such a situation, but by their
understanding only Congress would have had the power to authorize the
subsequent military retaliation.3 6 Nevertheless, investigation into this

original intent -has been of limited interest to those scholars who advocate a wider presidential war power than that outlined above. It has
been argued that the expressed intentions of the framers may be dismissed as ancient history, of little relevance to our nation's present
super power status. 37 This section contrasts such a rejection of the fram-

ers' intent with judicial construction of the war powers clauses.
"Adaption by usage" is a shorthand way of expressing the idea that
if a certain practice, admittedly contrary to the intention of the framers,
is followed for a certain length of time, it will achieve legitimation without the formalities of constitutional amendment. Arguing that repeated
practice has legitimized the use of an executive agreement in place of

a treaty, Myres McDougal of the Yale Law School and Asher Lans proposed a theoretical basis for the adaption by usage concept:
The powers of the different branches of the Government must
move in the same orbits and they cover the same objects. Nor is
it of supreme importance today to indulge in literary speculation
"Mr. Biester. [Do you] agree that the framers intended the Congress to have the dominant role in determining whether we went to war?
"[Professor Alexander M. Bickel]. The only problem that the framers faced was how
to vest this power in Congress without getting themselves into the kind of problem they
faced under the Articles of Confederation where Congress began to wage war as a committee.
'"That is why they chose 'declare' as against 'make.' They came entirely from the
other direction. There was no doubt in their minds that the war power was to be legislative. The problem was how to keep the President as effective Commander-in-Chief.
"It was not even a shared power, I think, in their minds."
36. See text accompanying notes 1-35 supra.
37. See, e.g., Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad Law: The War Powers Act, 50
TEXAs L. REv. 833, 843-44 (1972): "The most serious illusion of legal positivism is
the notion that 'the original intention' of those who drafted and voted for a law is thereIt is psycholoafter knowable, save as a guideline of broad purpose or principle ....
gically impossible for a man of the twentieth century, however learned and sensitive,
to perceive the world as the men of 1787 did. There is no way for him to reproduce
the structure and climate of their universe-to understand as they did the relation of
the several parts to each other and the weight which various fears, concerns and ambitions had in their minds. (citation omitted.)" Professor Rostow seems to imply that
the historical search is of little value, for the object of the investigation-an approximation of the historical truth about a culture, political institution, etc.-is an unknowable,
somewhat analogous to the mystery of the Trinity in Christian theology.
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about why the Framers created these overlaps or how some of the
Framers may have expected such conflicts to be resolved. The important fact today, from any consciously adaptive or instrumental
approach to the Constitution, is the fact that this very great flexibility
affords opportunity
for the development by usage of
procedures, immediately responsible to the democratic will of the
whole country .... 38
Once the value of historical inquiry is dismissed, and the "democratic will of the whole country" appealed to, 39 these authors assert that
the chief justification for adaption by usage is its flexibility:
The ultimate advantage of usage over formal textual alteration as a method of constitutional change is that, while it preserves
the formal symmetry of the document, it reduces the danger of
freezing the structures of government within the mold dictated by
the expediences or political philosophy of any given era.40
Utilization of the adaption by usage theory to justify expansion of
the president's war powers41 received its first serious discussion in a
1912 monograph prepared by J. Reuben Clark, the Solicitor of the State
Department.4
Professor Francis Wormuth of the political science faculty at the University of Utah who located the monograph, noted that
with two exceptions, all of Clark's examples of presidential use of force
without congressional authorization "could be regarded as nonpolitical
interposition for the protection of citizens."4 3 Although Clark suggested that the president's executive power supplied a tentative constitutional basis for these unauthorized acts, he also admitted that this justification was made "with no thought or pretense of more than a cursory
consideration. It is entirely possible that a more detailed and careful
study would lead to other or modified conclusions." 4 Clark's argu38. McDougal & Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential
Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy, 54 YALE L.J. 181, 220-21

(1945) (footnote omitted) (hereinafter cited as McDougal & Lans].
39. According to McDougal and Lans, the president embodies our nation's "democratic will" because of his "unique responsibility to the voters of the whole nation." See
id. at 534. Even if one assumes that the president is somehow more accountable to the
electorate than a senator or representative, the fact remains that war-making under our
Constitution is a congressional prerogative, and was never intended to be exercised by
one man no matter how overwhelmingly he was elected.
40. McDougal &Lans, supra note 38, at 294.
41. For a defense of this position and a list of incidents which constitute the usage
see Hearings on War Powers Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. 354-55 (1971) (remarks of Senator Goldwater) and id. at 359-75 ("Chronological List of 153 Military Actions Taken by the United States Abroad Without a Declaration of War").
42. J. CLARK, RIGHT TO PROTECT CITIZENS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES BY LANDING

FoRcEs (3d ed. 1934) [hereinafter cited as CLAMu].

43. Wormuth, The Nixon Theory of the War Power: A Critique, 60 CALIF. L.
RaV. 623, 663 (1972) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited as Wormuth].
44. CLARK, supra note 42, at 48.
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ment, as summarized by Wormuth, is that: 1) international law is part
of the law of the United States; 2) United States citizens abroad are
protected by international law; 3) under the Constitution, the president
"shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed;"" and therefore
4) the president may himself carry out "non-political interposition" in
his rightful execution of international law. Wormuth dismisses this
syllogism in an abrupt fashion:
The weakness of the argument, of course, is that citizens of
the United States have no rights whatever at international law.
Foreign states owe duties to the United States and not to its citizens. The vindication of the rights of the United States at international law has been entrusted
by the Constitution to Congress
4
and not to the President. 0
After World War II proponents of unrestrained presidential warmaking power used the adaption by usage argument to claim that the
commander in chief clause gave the president war powers much broader
than the framers had envisioned. 47 After President Truman ordered
our troops into battle in South Korea, Secretary of State Dean Acheson
recommended to the president that he report to Congress on the developing situation in the war zone. "I also recommended," recalls Acheson, "that the President should not ask for a resolution of approval but
to rest on his constitutional authority as Commander in Chief of the
armed forces.148 Mentioning a 1950 State Department memorandum
his staff had prepared listing eighty-seven instances in which Truman's
predecessors had taken military action without a declaration of war,
Acheson asserted that he never had "any serious doubt . . . of the
President's constitutional authority to do what he did. 49
The following justification for the Vietnam war, given by the State
Department in 1966, further illustrates the tendency of modern presidents to assume powers beyond those of directing a war which Congress
-hasdeclared:
Under the Constitution, the President, in addition to being
Chief Executive, is Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.
He holds the prime responsibility for the conduct of United States
foreign relations. These duties carry very broad powers, including
the power to deploy American forces abroad and commit them to
military operations when the President deems such action necessary
to maintain the security and defense of the United States. 0
45. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 3, cl. 1.
46. Wormuth, supra note 43, at 663.
47. See text accompanying notes 13-26 supra.
48. D. ACHESON, PRESENT AT THE CREATION 414 (1969).
49. Id. at 415.
50. Meeker, The Legality of United States Participationin the Defense of VietNam, 54 DEPT. STATE BULL. 474,484 (1966).
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In 1973, a State Department spokesman, responding to a request
that he state the authority under which President Nixon ordered the
bombing of Cambodia after all American troops had left Vietnam,
answered that the president had the right as commander in chief to
order any military action he considered necessary to bring the war in
Indochina to an end."
These views, resting upon the adaption by usage theory, indicate
acceptance of an expansion of presidential power to decide when our
national security is sufficiently endangered to require the use of military
force. President Ford may -have had such a constitutional theory in
mind when he asserted that his "constitutional executive power and his
authority as Commander-in-Chief" gave him the power to order the
military retaliation after the Mayaguez seizure. 52 This position certainly
contradicts the expectations
of the members of the adopting and ratify53
ing conventions.
B. Judicial Interpretation of the War Powers Clauses
The interpretation given the war powers clauses by the judiciary
stands in sharp contrast to the seemingly limitless claims made by
proponents of the adaption by usage argument. Early opinions of the
Supreme Court, or by members of the Court sitting as circuit justices,
are of particular value since they were written by men who attended the
Constitutional Convention of 1787 or the subsequent ratifying conventions. They therefore had first-hand knowledge of the intended meaning of the phrases "declare War" and "commander in chief."
In two cases which determined the right to maritime prizes captured in the "quasi-war" with France during the late 1790's, the Supreme Court underlined the plenary character of congressional authority
to initiate hostilities and to establish their scope. In Bas v. Tingy54 Justice Chase commented on the breadth of the clause "to declare War:"
Congress is empowered to declare a general war, or congress
may wage a limited war; limited in place, in objects, and in time.
If a general war is declared, its extent and operations are only restricted and regulated by the jus belli, forming a part of the law
51. See Hearings on War Powers, supra note 35, at 135-36.

52. See text accompanying note 179 infra.
53. See text accompanying notes 1-35 supra.
54. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800). In this case Bas, plaintiff in error and master
of the Eliza, an American merchant vessel captured by a French privateer, was ordered
to pay salvage to Tingy, defendant in error and commander of the American naval vessel
which recaptured the Eliza from the French. Such payment was required by the Act
of March 2, 1799 (1 Stat. 716) as an incentive for naval participation in the "quasiwar."
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of nations; but if a partial [war] is waged, its extent and operation
depend on our municipal [i.e., national] laws. 5
Justice Chase, in discussing the limits placed on this particular war
by Congress, recognized that Congress at times will specify the scope of
war:
[C]ongress has authorized hostilities on the high seas by certain
persons in certain cases. There is no authority given to commit
hostilities on land; to capture unarmed French vessels, nor even to
capture French armed vessels lying in a French port: . . . So -far
it is, unquestionably, a partial war; but, nevertheless, it is a public
56
war, on account of the public authority from which it emanates.
Justice Paterson, who had served as a delegate from New Jersey to
the Constitutional Convention, repeated his colleague's emphasis on the
exclusive authority of Congress to initiate, and place limits on, all types
the war on
of hostilities: "As far as congress tolerated and authorised
57
our part, so far may we proceed in hostile operations.
In Talbot v. Seeman5" the Court was asked to order salvage paid to

a United States warship for the recapture of a neutral vessel from the
French. Chief Justice Marshall looked to Congress as the source of the
individual rights involved and for a definition of America's relationship
with France during the hostilities: "The whole powers of war being, by
the constitution of the United States, vested in congress, the acts of that
body can alone be resorted to as our guides in this inquiry." 59 The
chief justice would have found most peculiar the State Department's
claim 0 that the president also has power to order military operations
when he considers this step necessary to preserve our national security.

The indictment in United States v. Smith6 alleged that William

Smith planned and outfitted in New York a military expedition against
the Spanish in what is now Venezuela thereby violating an act of
Congress." Smith sought to compel a number of President Jefferson's
55. Id. at 43.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 45.
58. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 1 (1801).
59. Id. at 28.
60. See text accompanying note 50 supra.
61. 27 F. Cas. 1192 (No. 16342a) (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806). Smith was acquitted by
the jury. United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1233, 1245 (No. 16342a) (C.C.D.N.Y.
1806). For the complete report of this case see T. LLOYD, THE TRIALS OF WI.,IAM
S. SMITH AND SAMUEL G. OGDEN (1807). For an excellent discussion of this case and
the light it sheds on the questions of executive privilege, implied presidential war-making
power and the president's power to dispense with or suspend our nation's laws, see Reinstein, An Early View of Executive Powers and Privilege: The Trial of Smith and Ogden,
2 M-Sr. CoNsr. L.Q. 309 (1975).
62. Smith allegedly violated the Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 50, § 5, 1 Stat. 384,
which prohibited any person within the jurisdiction of the United States from initiating
or aiding a military expedition against any country with which America was at peace.
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appointees, including Secretary of State James Madison, to appear as
witnesses to testify that Smith's expedition had the support of the
president. In ruling that this testimony was immaterial, Justice Paterson of the Supreme Court, sitting in his capacity as circuit justice,
commented upon the extent of the president's executive powers:
The president of the United States cannot control the statute,
nor dispense with its execution, and still less can he authorize a
person to do what the law forbids. If he could, it would render
the execution of the laws dependent on his will and pleasure; which
is a doctrine that has not been set up, and will not meet with any
supporters in our government. 6 3
Justice Paterson then answered defense counsel's argument that the
president himself had war-making power and thus could authorize
Smith's adventure:
Does [the president] possess the power of making war? That
power is exclusively vested in congress; for, by the eighth section
of the 1st article of the constitution, it is ordained, that congress
shall have power to declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, raise and support armies, [etc.] ....
. . . Congress does not choose to go to war; and where is the
individual among us who could legally do so without their permission? 4
The Supreme Court has made similar pronouncements regarding
the lack of presidential war-making power in cases arising out of the
Mexican War,65 the Civil War66 and the Korean war,6 when, as has
already been noted, 68 President Truman's advisors advanced claims of
63. 27 F. Cas. 1192, 1230 (No. 16342a) (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806).
64. Id. at 1230-3 1. Lest it be objected that such a constitutional scheme could not
safeguard national security in the face of true emergencies, Congress at an early date
provided for these situations by statute. By the Act of Feb. 28, 1795, ch. 36, §§ 12, 1 Stat. 424, the president was authorized to call out the militia in the case of invasion
or imminent danger of invasion of the United States, an insurrection in any state, or
to suppress "combinations" against the laws of the United States. The provisions which
take effect in a situation of insurrection or interference with state or federal authority
are still in force. 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-33 (1970).
65. See Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603 (1850). "[The president's] duty
and his power are purely military. As commander-in-chief, he is authorized to direct
the movements of the naval and military forces placed by law at his command. ....
The power of the President . . . was simply that of a military commander prosecuting
a war waged against a public enemy by the authority of his government." Id. at 615
(Taney, C.J.).
66. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862). "By the Constitution, Congress alone has the power to declare a national or foreign war. . . . [The president] has
no power to initiate or declare a war either against a foreign nation or a domestic State."
Id. at 668 (Grier, J.).
67. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
68. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
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unlimited executive war-making based on the commander in chief
clause. In 1952 during the Korean War a strike interrupted production
at most of the large steel mills. President Truman, claiming that "a
work stoppage would immediately jeopardize and imperil our national
defense. . . and would add. to the continuing danger of our soldiers,
sailors, and airmen engaged in combat in the field," 69 ordered the mills
seized "by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and
laws of the United States, and as President of the United States and
Commander in Chief of the armed forces of the United States. ...
Truman acted entirely without statutory authorization since Congress
had rejected an amendment to the Taft-Hartley Act 7 1 which would have
permitted such governmental seizures as a method of preventing work
stoppages and settling labor disputes. 72 The claim therefore presumably rested on the theory of implied or inherent powers, somehow derived
from an amalgam of the president's constitutional powers as executive
and commander in ohief. The mill owners argued that the president's
order was a usurpation of the legislative function which the Constitution
had expressly conferred on Congress and not on the president. The
Court in the Steel Seizure Case73 held that the president had no authority to issue such an order and that consequently the seizure orders could
not stand. In the opinion, written by Justice Black, the Court rejected
the theory of inherent powers, explaining that "The power of Congress
to adopt such public policies as those proclaimed by the order is beyond
question. . . The Constitution does not subject this lawmaking
'74
power of Congress to presidential or military supervision or control.
While the opinions in the Steel Seizure Case do not directly discuss
the power of a president to wage war without congressional permission,
at. least two of the concurring justices took pains to counter the argument that the president has certain inherent powers. Justice Frankfurter wrote:
Absence of authority in the President to deal with a crisis does
not imply want of power in the Government. Conversely the fact
that power exists in the Government does not vest it in the President. The need for new legislation
does not enact it. Nor does
it repeal or amend existing law. 7 5
In Justice Jackson's view the constitutional rule was absolute:
69. Exec. Order No. 10,340, 3 C.F.R. 861 (Comp. 1952) reprintedin Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 590-91 (1952).
70. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 591 (1952).
71. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 171-82 (1970).
72. See 93 CONG. REC. 3637-45 (1947).
73. 343 U.S. at 586-89.
74. Id. at 588.
75. Id. at 603-04 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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The appeal . . . that we declare the existence of inherent
powers ex necessitate to meet an emergency asks us to do what
many think would be wise, although it is something the forefathers
omitted. They knew what emergencies were, knew the pressures
they engender for authoritative action, knew, too, how they afford a ready pretext for usurpation. We may also suspect that they
suspected that emergency powers would tend to kindle emergencies.... I do not think we rightfully may so amend their work,
and, if we could, I am not convinced it would be wise to do
so.

.

76

Thus, the Supreme Court has adhered to the framers' intent that
Congress have plenary war powers and that the president's powers as
supreme military officer be limited to conducting congressionally authorized military operations and repelling sudden attacks on the United
States. Arguments for inherent powers, advanced by presidents who felt
restrained by these constitutional precepts, have been recognized by the
Court as without merit and possibly dangerous, in that inherent emergency powers might tend to kindle emergencies. Regarding the adaption by usage argument, the Court, speaking through Chief Justice
Warren in Powell v. McCormack, 7 ruled "[t]hat an unconstitutional
action has been taken before surely does not render that same action
any less unconstitutional at a later date."7 8

m.

Congressional Reassertion of Its War-Making Authority
A. The Background of the War Powers Resolution
One of the many lessons of the Vietnam debacle was the danger
that lies in congressional deference to presidential war-making. By
giving open-ended approval to any course of conduct the president
might have deemed necessary "to prevent further aggression," the Tonkin Gulf Resolution of 196471 represented the nadir in Congress' flight
from its constitutional responsiblity to decide on the question of war.
The resolution stated:
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as
Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any
armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent
further aggression.
76. Id. at 649-50 (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
77. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). The Court noted the argument that congressional precedent would indicate a contrary ruling, but held that the
House is without power to exclude any member-elect who meets the constitutional requirements for membership.
78. Id. at 546-47.
79. Act of August 10, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384.
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Section 3. This resolution shall expire when the President
shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the
United Nations or otherwise, except that it may be terminated
earlier by concurrent resolution of the Congress." °
The record of debate in the Senate on this resolution provides an
appalling illustration of the irresponsible attitude of Congress at that
time. The following exchange occurred between Senator Fulbright,
chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and President Johnson's
floor manager for the resolution, and Senator Brewster of Connecticut:
Mr BREWSTER. [M]y question is whether there is anything
in the resolution which would authorize or recommend or approve
the landing of large American armies in Vietnam or in China.
Mr FULBRIGHT. There is nothing in the resolution, as I
read it, that contemplates it. I agree with the Senator that this
is the last thing we would want to do. However, the language of
the resolution would not prevent it. It would authorize whatever
the Commanderin Chief feels is necessary.,,
It took five years, fifty thousand American combat deaths, bitter
opposition to the war at home, and transition from a Democratic to a
Republican administration in the White House before Congress began to
reassert the authority it had delegated to the president by the Tonkin
Gulf Resolution. In 1969 the Senate adopted the National Commitments Resolution, which expressed the sense of the Senate that:
[A] national commitment by the United States results only from
affirmative action taken by the executive and legislative branches
of the United States Government by means of a treaty, statute, or
concurrent resolution of both Houses of Congress specifically
providing for such commitment.82
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee understood the resolution
to be:
[A]n invitation to the executive to reconsider its excesses, and
to the legislature to reconsider its omissions, in the making of foreign policy, and in the light of such reconsideration, to bring their
foreign policy practices back into compliance with that division of
responsibilities envisioned by the Constitution and sanctioned by
the Constitution and sanctioned by over a century of usage.8 3
President Nixon, however, chose not to accept an "invitation"
which carried no force of law. He ordered American forces to invade
Cambodia in 1970 and to support the South Vietnamese invasion of
80. Id.
81. 110 CONG. RFc. 18,403 (1964) (emphasis added).
82. S. Res. 85, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., in 115 CoNG. REc. 17,245 (1969).
83. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON NATIONAL COMMITMENTS,
S. REP. No. 129, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1969).
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Laos in 1971 without seeking the advice and consent of Congress.84 He
did this even though the repealed Gulf of Tonkin Resolution 5 could no
longer
be used as a possible basis for claiming congressional authorization.8 6
During 1973 the last United States combat soldier left Southeast
Asia, the Paris Accords were signed, and revelations stemming from the
Watergate affair shattered the nation's confidence in the Nixon administration. Given this combination of circumstances, chances were excellent that Congress would pass some form of war powers legislation and
override the anticipated Nixon veto.
The War Powers Resolution of 1973,87 the product of a three year
effort in both houses of Congress and termed by one of its chief
sponsors a means to "restore the rightful role of Congress under the
Constitution,"8 8 was a measure that reconciled House Joint Resolution
542, with Senate Bill 440, styled as a Senate amendment to the House
Joint Resolution. Its purpose and policy section includes a statement of
presidential war-making authority:
The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-inChief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or
into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly
indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1)
a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3)
a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its
territories or possessions, or its armed forces.8 9
Other provisions of the resolution require the president to consult
with Congress whenever possible before introducing United States
armed forces into hostilities or where imminent involvement in hostilities
is clearly indicated, and to continue consultation until the armed forces
are no longer involved in the hostile situation.9 0 In order to provide
Congress with the information it needs to decide whether or not to
authorize military action,"' the president must submit written reports to
84. S. REP.No. 220, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1973).
85. Act of Jan. 12, 1971, PuB. L. No. 91-672, § 12, 84 Stat. 2053.
86. The question of whether or not the Tonkin Gulf Resolution was the equivalent
of an antecedent declaration of war is discussed in Van Alstyne, Congress, the President,
and the Power to Declare War: A Requiem for Vietnam, 121 U. PA. L. Rav. 1, 2328 (1972). Professor Van Alstyne takes the position that until January 12, 1971, when
Richard Nixon signed the repeal measure, the war in Southeast Asia was congressionally
authorized, but that after this date President Nixon's direction of the war was unconstitutional.
87. War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1541 et seq. (Supp. 1973).
88. 119 CONG. REc. 33,038 (1973) (remarks of Representative Zablocki).
89. War Powers Resolution, § 2(c), 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c) (Supp. 1973).
90. Id. § 3, 50 U.S.C. § 1542.
91. "Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference," H.R. REP. No.
547, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in 119 CONG. REC. 33,037 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference].
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the speaker of the House and the president pro tempore of the Senate,
setting forth the circumstances that made the introduction of the armed
forces necessary, the constitutional and legislative authority for this
action, and his estimate of the scope and duration of the involvement.
The initial presidential report must be submitted within forty-eight
hours of the introduction of force. The president is also required to
provide such other information as Congress may request following this
initial report, as well as supplementary reports at least every six months
while the armed forces are engaged in a hostile situation.9 2
The law provides for automatic termination of any military action
within sixty days of the forty-eight hour reporting period unless Congress has declared war or otherwise authorized the use of force, has
extended by law the sixty day period, or is unable to convene as a result
of an armed attack on the United States. 93 Notwithstanding this provision, presidential use of the armed forces can be terminated by a
concurrent resolution of Congress, which is not subject to presidential
veto. 94 The interpretation section 5 advises that nothing in the law is
intended to add to or subtract from the constitutional authority of
Congress or the president, or to grant the president any war-making
authority which "he would not have had in the absence of this joint
resolution."9 6

B. Analysis of the War Powers Resolution
The Senate amendment to the House Joint Resolution, Senate Bill
440, contained a section entitled "Emergency Use of the Armed
Forces," which would have given the president a specific grant of
authority to introduce the United States into hostilities or into situations
where imminent involvement in hostilities was indicated. 7 Proposed
subsection (1) of section 3 included a reiteration of the president's
constitutionally recognized authority to repel sudden attacks on the
United States, its territories and possessions, and to forestall the
immediate threat of such an attack. 98 It also proposed to grant the
president power to take "necessary and appropriate" retaliatory action if
such an attack were to occur. 99 Since the power to retaliate is not
embodied in the president's role as commander in chief,' 00 this subsec92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

War Powers Resolution, § 4, 50 U.S.C. § 1543 (Supp. 1973).
Id. § 5(b), 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b).
Id. § 5(c), 50 U.S.C. § 1544(c).
Id. § 8, 50 U.S.C. § 1547.
Id. § 8(d), 50 U.S.C. § 1547(d).
S. 440, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1973).
Id. § 3(1).
Id.
See text accompanying notes 7-17 supra.
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tion is best characterized as an attempted delegation of authority by
Congress under the "necessary and proper" clause of the Constitu-

tion.10 1 Subsection (2) would have given the president authority to repel an attack against the armed forces, or to forestall an imminent threat
thereof, but no power to retaliate. 10 2 Subsection (3) would have authorized the president to make carefully limited use of the military to

"protect while evacuating' United States citizens and nationals whose
03
lives would be endangered on the high seas or in another country.

While the Foreign Relations Committee report on Senate Bill 440 implied that the president was given all the authority arrayed in subsections (1) to (3) of section 3 by the Constitution,' it acknowledged
that the only support for this statement was the assumption held by the
delegates to the Constitutional Convention that the president had the
power to repel sudden attacks. 0 5 The proposed subsection (3) of the
Senate's version must therefore be seen as another attempted delegation under the necessary and proper clause. Subsection (4) of section
3 of Senate Bill 440 declared that all other use of the armed forces

in hostilities must be pursuant to specific statutory authorization. 06

The preconference House Joint Resolution 542107 contained no
provision similar to section 3 of Senate Bill 440. Representative Dante

Fascell, a senior member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs
responsible for the legislation, explained that such an emergency provi-

sion was avoided for fear that it would dangerously expand the type of
101. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17: "[Congress shall have power] To make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers,
and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States,
or in any Department or Officer thereof."
102. S. 440, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(2) (1973).
103. Id. § 3(3): "to protect while evacuating citizens and nationals of the United
States, as rapidly as possible, from (A) any situation on the high seas involving a direct
and imminent threat to the lives of such citizens and nationals, or (B) any country in
which such citizens and nationals are present with the express or tacit consent of the
government of such country and are being subjected to a direct and imminent threat to
their lives, either sponsored by such government or beyond the power of such government to control; but the President shall make every effort to terminate such a threat
without using the Armed Forces of the United States and shall, where possible, obtain
the consent of the government of such country before using the Armed Forces of the
United States to protect citizens and nationals of the United States being evacuated from
such country."
104. See S. REP. No. 220, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1975).
105. "Subsections (1), (2), and (3) are codifications of the President's authority
to 'repel sudden attacks' and protect U.S. nationals whose lives are endangered abroadpowers based on established precedent and the intention of the Constitutional Convention, as evidenced by Madison's notation about 'leaving to the Executive the power to
repel sudden attacks'." Id. See text accompanying notes 7-17 supra.
106. S. 440, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(4) (1973).
107. H.R.J. Res. 542, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
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military action the president could take without congressional authorization:
To specifically define his authority as S. 440 seeks to do, would
give the President statutory authority he does not now have.
House Joint Resolution 542 avoids this, and in addition specifically
states that the proposal does not add to any existing powers of the
President. 108
The Senate and House proposals for war powers legislation were
thus in direct conflict on the crucial question of whether to delegate
additional war powers to the president. This conflict is dramatically
exposed when the alternative approaches are applied to the Mayaguez
incident. Had the conference committee accepted the Senate version,
specifically subsection (3) of section 3,109 the president would have had
express authorization to use the armed forces to rescue the Mayaguez
and its crew, since this would have been an action to protect, while
evacuating, our citizens on the -high seas or in a foreign country. The
House version, on the other hand, gave the president no express authority to use military force in a situation such as that presented by the
Mayaguez seizure. The constitutionality of President Ford's direction
of the military operations after the Mayaguez seizure therefore rests
squarely on whether or not the War Powers Resolution in its final form
delegated such authority to the president.
The House position was adopted by the conference committee and
included in the War Powers Resolution as the "Purpose and Policy"
section, a portion of which is quoted above. 10 The conference report
explained that "[slubsequent sections of the joint resolution are not
dependent upon the language of this subsection, as was the case with a
l
similar provision of the Senate bill (section 3)."'I
Senator Eagleton of
Missouri argued that this compromise destroyed any effect the bill might
have -had:
[The declaration of presidential authority] is in the "Purpose
and Policy" section of this bill. It is in essence no more binding
than a "whereas" clause in a Kiwanis Club resolution.
So the words in section 2(c) do not mean a thing. . . . In
effect, the very heart of the Senate bill, S. 440, have [sic] been
placed in
the "whereas" section-the pious pronouncement of
3 2
nothing.
Senator Javits of New York, the chief architect of Senate Bill 440,
defended the compromise with the explanation that when the conference
committee stated that subsequent sections were not dependent on the
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

119 CONG. REc. 21,228 (1973).
See text accompanying note 103 supra.
See text accompanying note 89 supra.
Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, supra note 91.
119 CONG. RFc. 33,555 (1973.).
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language of subsection 2(c), it merely announced that the delineation of

the president's war powers under the commander in chief clause does
not call the subsequent provisions of the law into effect." 3

The con-

sultation"' and reporting requirements," 5 for example, apply to any
presidential use of the armed forces, whether or not within the scope of
subsection 2(c)."16
Whatever the meaning of the conference report language, the

declaration contained in subsection 2(c) is at least important "as a
refutation of excessive and overblown claims of authority argued in
recent years by executive branch lawyers for the President."" 7 The
Constitution is binding on the president; more binding in its restriction

on presidential action than any congressional delegation of its own war
powers could be. What is constitutionally valid in subsection 2(c) of
the war powers resolution is inescapably binding on the president even if
purpose and policy sections of a statute typically have no binding effect.

A much more serious objection to the war powers resolution is that
by limiting unauthorized presidential military actions after sixty, or in
some cases, ninety days, the law implicitly delegates unfettered war
113. 119 CONG. REc. 33,555 (1973) (remarks of Senator Javits).
114. See text accompanying note 90 supra. H.R. REP. No. 287, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973), reprintedin 2 U.S. CODE, CONG. AND ADMIN. NEWS, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2344
(1973) explains, at 2350-51, that the "use of the word 'every' reflects the committee's
belief that such consultation prior to the commitment of armed forces should be inclusive. In other words, it should apply in extraordinary and emergency circumstanceseven when it is not possible to get formal congressional approval in the form of a declaration of war or other specific authorization.
"At the same time, through use of the word 'possible' it recognizes that a situation
may be so dire, e.g. hostile missile attack underway, and require such instantaneous action that no prior consultation will be possible ....
"A considerable amount of attention was given to the definition of consultation.
Rejected was the notion that consultation should be synonymous with merely being informed. Rather, consultation in this provision means that a decision is pending on a
problem and that Members of Congress are being asked by the President for their advice
and opinions and, in appropriate circumstances, their approval of the action contemplated. Furthermore, for consultation to be meaningful, the President himself must participate and all information relevant to the situation must be made available."
115. See text accompanying notes 91-92 supra.
116. See 119 CONG. REc. 33,550 (1973).
117. 119 CONG. REc. 33,549 (remarks of Senator Javits). The president's independent constitutional war-making authority comes into play only to repel a sudden attack on the United States, its territories or possessions. Subsection 2(c) does not mention an independent presidential power to order punitive retaliation. Nor is the president allowed, without congressional authorization, to order military action pursuant to
an attack on the armed forces-as subsection 2(c) incorrectly states. This provision
may possibly be read as congressional recognition that an armed forces unit subjected
to an unprovoked attack would of course have the right of self-defense. The president
cannot, however, order military action without congressional permission.
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powers to the president for that period. 118 It is possible to read subsections 5(b)119 and 5(c) 20 together with section 4121 to mean that the
president would be authorized, for a period of at least sixty days,
without the necessity of further congressional sanction, to send United
States armed forces into combat as long as he reports these actions
within forty-eight hours to the appropriate members of Congress. Moreover, while the War Powers Resolution cautions against a construction
which would give the president more authority than he would have if the
law were not in effect,' 2 2 the following exchange between Representative Eckhardt and Representative Zablocki, who chaired the subcommittee which drafted House Joint Resolution 542 and who was on the
conference committee responsible for the War Powers Resolution in its
final form, lends some support to such a construction:
Mr. ECKHARDT. If Congress may withdraw authority or
may negative the Presidential authority by virtue of concurrent resolution, such action implies that the President did not have authority in the beginning and Congress is merely asserting its authority
in that area.
If that is the case, one must infer, it seems to me, that the
President is acting within an area pre-empted for Congress by the
Constitutionexcept for the passageof this resolution.
Now, as I understood the gentleman to answer me, he does
not intend to give the President additional authority, but the gentleman concedes that the President may act beyond his authority, and
we only include this section [section 5] as a means by which Congress can reaffirm the fact that the presidential action was wrongful
in the first place.
118. See 119 CONG. REC. 33,870, 33,872, 36,207 (1973) (remarks of'Representatives Abzug, Holtzman and Thomson, respectively).
119. War Powers Resolution, § 5(b), 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (Supp. 1973) provides
that "Within sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or is required to be submitted
pursuant to section 1543(a) (1) of this title, whichever is earlier, the President shall terminate any use of United States Armed Forces with respect to which such report was
submitted (or required to be submitted), unless the Congress (1) has declared war or
has enacted a specific authorization for such use of United States Armed Forces, (2)
has extended by law such sixty-day period, or (3) is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the United States. Such sixty-day period shall be extended
for not more than an additional thirty days if the President determines and certifies to
the Congress in writing that unavoidable military necessity respecting the safety of
United States Armed Forces requires the continued use of such armed forces in the
course of bringing about a prompt removal of such forces."
120. Id. § 5(c), 50 U.S.C. § 1544(c): "Notwithstanding subsection (b) of this section, at any time that United States Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities outside the
territory of the United States, its possessions and territories without a declaration of war
or specific statutory authorization, such forces shall be removed by the President if the
Congress so directs by concurrent resolution."
121. See text accompanying note 92 supra.
122. See text accompanying note 96 supra.
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Mr. ZABLOCKI. [Tihat is exactly right. 1 23
What does this mean? Subsection 8(d) declares that the War
Powers Resolution gives the president no additional authority. 2 4 Representative Zablocki asserted that he did not intend to give the president additional authority, but as this author understands the above
exchange, especially the underlined phrase, Representative Zablocki
tacitly acknowledged that despite the resolution, he expected the president to persist in the unconstitutional practice of making war without
congressional approval, while Congress continued to play a reactive role.
Such an interpretation cannot be ignored, nor can it be countered
solely by reference to the language of subsection 8(d). Future advocates of unauthorized military action might claim that subsection 5(b)
delegated war powers to the president which permit him to make war
anywhere in the world, at least for sixty to ninety days. Assuming that
this interpretation is possible, the next inquiry must be into the constitutionality of this delegation of legislative power to the executive.
Chief Justice Marshall established the foundations of the law of
delegation in Wayman v. Southard:2 - "It will not be contended that
Congress can delegate to the Courts, or to any other tribunals, powers
which are strictly and exclusively legislative."' 126 Marshall recognized,
of course, the distinction between "those important subjects, which must
be entirely regulated by the legislature itself," and "those of less interest,
in which a general provision may be made, and power given to those
1 27
who are to act under such general provisions, to fill up the details."'
An unconditional sixty to ninety day delegation of war-making authority
to the president is certainly no matter of "less interest," in light of the
potential for mass destruction in a war of even this relatively short
128
period. More recently, in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,'
the Supreme Court again ruled that it was not within the power of
Congress to avoid its constitutional responsibility:
The Congress is not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to
others the essential legislative functions with which it is thus vested.
123. 119 CONG. REc. 33,860 (1973) (emphasis added).
124. War Powers Resolution, § 8(d), 50 U.S.C. § 1547(d) (Supp. 1973): "Nothing
in this joint resolution(1) is intended to alter the constitutional authority of the Congress or of the President,
or the provisions of existing treaties; or
(2) shall ne construed as granting any authority to the President with respect to the
introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein
involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances which authority he
would not have had in the absence of this joint resolution."
125. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825).
126. Id. at 42.
127. Id. at 43.
128. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
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S..T]he Constitution has never been regarded as denying to
Congress the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality,
which will enable it to perform its function in laying down policies
and establishing standards, while leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits and
the determination of facts to which the policy as declared by the
legislature is to apply. But we said that the constant recognition
of the necessity and validity of such provisions, and the wide range
of administrative authority which has been developed by means of
them, cannot be allowed to obscure the limitations of the authority
to delegate, if our constitutional system is to be maintained. 29

It is obvious that a congressional grant to the president of sixty to
ninety days of unfettered power to make war anywhere in the world for
any reason whatever is insufficiently defined to be a valid delegation of
an essential legislative function. Professor William Van Alstyne of the
Duke University Law School argues, however, that no delegation by
Congress of its war powers is constitutionally permissible. 130 At the
heart of his thesis is the belief that the "specific contingencies which give
sense and shape to the general doctrine permitting limited delegations of
legislative power in other areas of congressional responsibility are already provided for in respect to war, so far as it was felt safe to do
so.'1 31 For example, Professor Van Alstyne points out that the president is given the capacity to respond to the emergency situation of a
sudden attack on the United States. His role of commander in chief
makes him the master of military strategy once war has been authorized
by Congress. In addition, congressional war powers are sufficiently
flexible to enable Congress to declare either total or limited wars, and to
strictly 32
prescribe the aims and objects of any use of the nation's armed
forces.
129. Id. at 529-30.
130. Van Alstyne, Congress, the President, and the Power to Declare War: A
Requiem for Vietnam, 121 U. PA. L R.v. 1, 16-19 (1972).
131. Id. at 17.
132. Van Alstyne stresses that "pursuit of national interest by sustained extraterritorial uses of direct force was textually reserved to Congress alone after alternative
formulations were pressed on precisely the grounds that conventionally rationalize a limited power to delegate an interstitial lawmaking authority to the executive, viz., superior
expertise in the executive, the need for flexibility in the face of rapidly changing circumstances, the cumbersomeness of parliamentary processes, and a residual power to check
the executive in the event of displeasure with the manner in which he might make war.
To the extent that such arguments were considered to have merit, they were accommodated by other means among the several war-related clauses. To the extent that they
were not thus accommodated, the conclusion seems inescapable that they were rejected
and correspondingly, that no further latitude of executive control was to be permitted
than that already provided for." Id. at 16-17. The Constitution may no more be
changed through legislative delegation of the war power than through usage. James
Madison espoused the prevailing sentiment of the framers when he wrote that: "Every
just view that can be taken of this subject, admonishes the public of the necessity of
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Whether one applies the Schechter standard of legislative delegation to the question of delegation of war powers, 133 or agrees with Van
Alstyne that even limited delegation in this area is impermissible, the

War Powers Resolution is unconstitutional if it authorizes the president
at his sole discretion to commit the United States to armed conflict even
if only for a period of sixty to ninety days. The Christmas season
bombing of the Hanoi-Haiphong area in 1972, ordered by President
Nixon, without any congressional authorization, took far less than sixty
days to accomplish. Consider further the catastrophic results certain to
follow from a preemptive or first strike nuclear attack on an adversary
similarly armed. Should the right to make such a decision belong to
one individual? Even if the sixty to ninety day delegation does not
contemplate nuclear war, this interpretation of the War Powers Resolution, if accepted, gives the president the authority to make such a decision. 3 4

Although the prior analysis suggests that the War Powers Resolution may be unconstitutional, it is perhaps more accurate to say that the
ambiguity of this law provides the opportunity for an unconstitutional
interpretation by a president unwilling to seek prior congressional permission for military operations. In such a case the question centers on
the particular wisdom, rather than the constitutionality, of including the
time limit. A future president may argue that despite the subsection

8(d) provision against a construction of the law which would alter his
constitutional war making authority,' 35 the War Powers Resolution
recognizes, and implicitly legitimates, a sixty day exercise of any war
powers the president may claim.

Congress might order -him to cease

hostilities by the concurrent resolution procedure of subsection 5(c)
before these sixty days are over, 36 but even in that case the president
a rigid adherence to the simple, the received, and the fundamental doctrine of the constitution, that the power to declare war, including the power of judging the causes of war,
is fully and exclusively vested in the legislature; that the executive has no right, in any
case, to decide the question, whether there is or is not cause for declaring war." 6 J.
Madison, Letters of Helvidius in WRrriNGs 138, 174 (G. Hunt ed. 1906) quoting Berger, supranote 10, at 48 (emphasis partially added).
133. See text accompanying notes 128-29 supra.
134. While explaining the limited authority that section 3 of S. 440 would have
granted the president, Senator Eagleton remarked that "[tihe questions of whether to expressly prohibit the President from initiating a preemptive nuclear attack was debated
at some length. I finally had to concede that, in the final analysis, all any legislation
can expect to achieve is to hold the President legally and politically accountable for his
actions. The consequences that would follow a first strike nuclear attack by the United
States would make the question of political and legal responsibility moot." 119 CONG.
REc. 24, 543-44 (1973).
135. See note 124 supra.
136. See note 120 supra.
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could certify to Congress, as subsection 5(b) provides,13 7 that the safety
of the armed forces requires that military action continue for another
thirty days while these same forces are being withdrawn.
The War Powers Resolution may spare us from protracted presidential wars such as our country endured in both Korea and Vietnam,
but it is not clear that it will be at all effective in controlling a president
before the war takes on an extended character. Most wars have been
popular in their first sixty days. Some military actions are completed
before they have a chance to become unpopular. The president who
ordered the action may overwhelm Congress and the electorate with his
version of the facts and his interpretation of the crisis. Sixty days may
not be enough time for facts other than the official version to emerge
and for critics of the presidential policy to receive an adequate hearing.
What this suggests, of course, is that the mere enactment of a law
limiting presidential power is incapable of controlling a determined
president. The reassertion of Congress' constitutionally mandated authority may depend less on war powers legislation than on the development of congressional will and capacity to decide when to utilize or hold
in abeyance our military might. The War Powers Resolution may be
seen as a necessary step in this development. Claims that the president's war-making power is all encompassing have at last been challenged. Thus the stage was set for a reversal of the post World War II
practice whereby presidents have committed the United States to participation in wars without congressional permission.
The next section of this note considers the Mayaguez affair as an
indication of whether or not Congress considers itself ready to go
beyond legislative enactment and fully assume its war-making prerogative.
IV.
A.

The Capture of Mayaguez and its Aftermath

Chronology of Events

On May 12, 1975 at 12:21 a.m., E.D.T.,1 38 the United States
merchant ship Mayaguez was fired on, boarded and seized by a Cambodian naval vessel in the Gulf of Thailand, sixty miles off the coast of
39
Cambodia and seven nautical miles southwest of Poulo Wai Island.1
137. See note 119 supra.
138. All times given are Eastern Daylight Time. To convert to Gulf of Thailand
time add eleven hours.
139. This chronology of the Mayaguez affair has been compiled from two sources
1) PENTAGON ANSWERS TO CONGRESSIONAL INQuiRY, obtained through the office of

Congressman Ron Dellums [hereinafter cited as

PENTAGON ANSWERS];

and 2) the N.Y.

Times, May 16, 1975, at 14, col. 2. Neither chronology will hereafter be cited
for the timing of an event mentioned in the text unless there is a significant discrepancy
between the two sources, in which case both accounts will be given.
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That afternoon a White House spokesman asserted that the ship was
taken in international waters and that President Ford considered this
seizure to be "an act of piracy" by the new communist government in

Cambodia, 14 0 which had taken power only the month before following
the collapse of the Lon Nol regime. State Department lawyers would

not openly discuss the international legal aspects of the seizure, but they
downplayed the president's charge of piracy, noting that under inter-

national law this term is not applied when the aggressor vessel flies a

national flag. 4 ' The legal questions surrounding the immediate seizure
were complex. While Cambodia claimed that its territorial waters extend
for twelve miles from its shoreline, its sovereignty over Poulo Wai was
disputed by South Vietnam. State Department officials thereby acknowledged that the ship could be said to have been in Cambodia's territorial
waters when it was seized. 14 2 Subsequent attempts to classify the seizure
have described it as a violation of the Mayaguez's "right of innocent
passage' on an established trade route, and as such a clear violation of

international law. 43
President Ford learned of the seizure about 7:40 a.m.
chairing a meeting of the
manded, through the State
immediately, adding that
serious consequences."' 4 4

After

National Security Council at noon, he deDepartment, that Cambodia release the ship
"[f]ailure to do so would have the most
At 4:30 that afternoon a representative of

the liaison office of the People's Republic of China was summoned to
the State Department to relay this demand to Cambodian authorities.
The Chinese representative refused to accept the message. 45 Later that

afternoon two United States Navy destroyers, a support ship and an
aircraft carrier were ordered to the Gulf of Thailand from various
140. N.Y. Times, May 13, 1975 at 1, col. 8.
141. Id. at 19, col. 7. A pirate has been defined as "one who roves the sea in an
armed vessel, without any commission from any sovereign state. on his own authority,
and for the purpose of seizing by force and appropriating to himself, without discrimination, every vessel he may meet." United States v. Baker, 24 F. Cas. 962, 965 (No. 14,501) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861).
142. N.Y. Times, May 13, 1975, at 19, col. 7.
143. This characterization was made in a resolution adopted by the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on May 14, intended as a "vote of confidence" for President Ford.
N.Y. Times, May 15, 1974, at 18, col. 7. For the purposes of this note it is unimportant
whether the passage of the Mayaguez was genuinely innocent. It is also unimportant
whether, as the Cambodians belatedly claimed, the Mayaguez was on an intelligence
mission that was part of a broader clandestine power to subvert and overthrow the revolutionary government. See Text of Cambodian Communique, N.Y. Times, May 16,
1975, at 15, col. 6. What is important is which branch, Congress or the Executive,
is charged by the Constitution with the duty to interpret, and if necessary enforce international law.
144. N.Y. Times, May 13, 1975, at 19, col. 5.
145. PENTAGON ANswEns, supra note 139 (answer to question number 1).
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locations in the western Pacific. By midnight of the twelfth, the Cambodians had moved the Mayaguez from Poulo Wai to the vicinity of Koh
Tang, an island thirty miles off the Cambodian coast. 14 6 At 12:10 a.m.
on the thirteenth, a representative of the United States liaison office in
Peking delivered messages to the Cambodian embassy there, 4 7 and also
to the foreign ministry of the People's Republic of China. 148
At 6:55 on the morning of the thirteenth, the president directed
the Commander in Chief Pacific to keep the Mayaguez away from the
Cambodian mainland. Later that morning the National Security Council convened and issued orders to isolate Koh Tang and to prevent
arrival or departure of vessels from the area. That evening between
6:00 and 7:00 congressional leaders were notified by telephone of the
president's orders to prevent the movement of the ship and crew. At
8:30 p.m., an A-7 aircraft sank a Cambodian patrol boat after it
appeared that an attempt was being made to remove the Mayaguez
crewmen to the mainland. At 10:40 that night the president chaired a
third meeting of the National Security Council, and by midnight discretionary authority was given to naval pilots to attack and sink any small
craft in the vicinity of Koh Tang. Until this time all decisions to sink
any vessels had been made in Washington.
The next day, May 14, at 11:00 a.m., congressional leaders received phone calls from the White House informing them that three
Cambodian patrol boats had been sunk and four damaged by United
States air strikes. That afternoon, State and Defense Department officials explained the situation to members of the House International
Relations Committee, the House Armed Services Committee and the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. After a late afternoon National
Security Council meeting the president himself held a one hour meeting
with a bipartisan group of selected congressmen, telling them of his
decision to begin military operations against Cambodia, including air
attacks against military facilities near the port of Sihanoukville.
146. The following account is derived mainly from PENTAGON ANSWERS, answer to

question number 1.
147. The content of the message was not disclosed.
148. PENTAGON ANswmts, question number 2: "What specific diplomatic options
were considered and rejected by the National Security Council in seeking the release of
the Mayaguez and its crew?" Answer: "Because of the urgency of the situation and
the lack of direct channels to the Cambodian authorities in Phnom Penh, it was judged
that the only effective and rapid channels were those used-the approach to the Chinese
here and in Peking, and the direct delivery of a message to the Cambodian representative in Peking. No other government which might have been helpful in the situation
has any representation in Phnom Penh and thus any effective contact with the authorities there." At 7:15 a.m. on May 14, according to the PENTAGON ANsWERs, the People's
Republic of China foreign ministry returned the United States message for the Cambodians. The record does. not indicate whether a Cambodian reply accompanied this

return.
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Because of a mistaken intelligence report that the Mayaguez crewmen were being held on Koh Tang, a marine helicopter assault was
ordered against the island to free them. At 7:07 p.m. Phnom Penh
domestic radio carried a message in Cambodian which agreed to American demands for the release of the ship and its crew. 4 9 This broadcast,
monitored and translated into English by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, was shown to the president at 8:15 p.m. In the
meantime, at 7:09 p.m. the marines arrived at Koh Tang. The unexpectedly heavy ground fire forced three of the eight helicopters in the
assault wave to crash on the beach or in the water and disabled two
more, making it necessary for them to return to the United States air
base at Utapao, Thailand with the marines they carried still on board.
Another group of marines boarded the Mayaguez from the destroyer
U.S.S. Holt about 9:00 p.m. and found no one on board the ship.
At 10:23 p.m. the destroyer U.S.S. Wilson sighted a boat flying a
white flag near Koh Tang. Thirty minutes later the Wilson radioed the
Pentagon that at least thirty caucasians were in the boat-actually all
thirty-nine crewmen of the Mayaguez were aboard. This news was not
relayed to the president until 11:14 p.m., despite the fact that radio
communication between Washington and the task force was instantaneous and uninterrupted. 15 0
Fighter-bombers took off from the flight deck of the U.S.S. Coral
Sea at 10:15, eight minutes before the boat containing the crewmen was
sighted. The first strike against the mainland reached Ream airfield at
10:57 where bombs cratered the runway, destroying seventeen Cambodian aircraft and an airplane hangar. At 11:16, two minutes after
learning that the crewmen were safe in American hands, the president
ordered all offensive operations to cease and the marines to withdraw
from Koh Tang. However, at 11:50 p.m. naval planes bombed a
petroleum and lubricants depot near Sihanoukville, causing extensive
damage.'
Furthermore, another marine assault was directed at Koh
Tang at 11:45 p.m. in order to protect the withdrawal of the marines
already there who were under heavy fire. Cambodian ground fire hit
three more helicopters but none crashed. The withdrawal was completed about 9:15 a.m. on May 15. American casualties included fifteen
dead, three missing and fifty wounded.' 52 Another twenty-three serv149. PENTAGON ANSWERS chronology contends that the wire made no mention of
the ship's crew, but the Times account said that the Cambodian broadcast, which appeared on news agency wires at 8:19 p.m. "made it clear that the Cambodians were
ready to accede to American demands." N.Y. Times, May 16, 1975, at 14, col. 1.
150. Id.

151. Disclosure of this second attack on mainland Cambodia was made a day later
than disclosure of the other military events of May 14. See N.Y. Times, May 17, 1975,
at 1, col. 7.
152. N.Y. Times, May 21, 1975, at 16, col. 1.
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icemen died when their helicopter crashed after taking off from Nakhom
Phanom Air Base in northeast Thailand on its way to Utapao. Although these men were deployed as a potential rescue force, they were
not counted as combat casualties by the Pentagon since they saw no
hostile action.' 5 3 No casualty account was available from the Cambodians.
B. The Political and Constitutional Implications of the
Mayaguez Incident
The seizure of the Mayaguez and its bloody aftermath has occurred
at a time when the question of our country's policy regarding the use of
military force as an arm of foreign relations remains unresolved. The
spring of 1975 saw the final defeat of American supported governments
in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia accompanied by an increased concern
among the small body of men that directs United States foreign policy
that our international stature had been diminished. Apparently feeling
that our allies doubted America's resolve to protect its interests, members of the administration concluded that the world needed to be
reassured of the power of the United States president to use military
force when these interests were threatened. 154 Unfortunately, most of
the discussion of our foreign policy after Vietnam has centered around
the rather limited question of whether we are capable of using military
force when the need arises rather than the more fundamental question of
what those occasions are that make military action necessary.
The Mayaguez incident must be analyzed both in political and
constitutional terms, because it was an outgrowth of this limited view of
international relations and because it has implications concerning Congress' declaration in the War Powers Resolution "to fulfill the intent of
the framers of the Constitution . . . ."I" The constitutional and
political considerations should not be treated separately where the mode
of decision making will often determine the validity or soundness of the
decision made. If Congress will not exercise its constitutional function
of choosing war or peace after full consideration of all the issues
involved, such decisions will fall to the president and his advisors, whose
policy discussions are likely to be nonadversarial. It is the rare executive appointee who will not fall into line, become a "team player" in the
153. N.Y. Times, May 22, 1975, at 1, cols. 2-3.
154. The New York Times reported that administration officials, including Secretary of State Kissinger and Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, were "eager to find some
dramatic means of underscoring President Ford's stated intention to 'maintain our leadership on a worldwide basis,'" and that these same officials made it clear that "they
welcomed the opportunity to show that Mr. Ford had the will and the means to use
American power to protect American interests." N.Y. Times, May 16, 1975, at 1, col. 6.
155. § 2(a), 50 U.S.C. § 1541(a) (Supp. 1973).
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face of a president (or a national security advisor or secretary of state)
whose mind is set on a particular course of action.15 6
Why was the Mayaguez captured in the first place? While the
Cambodian authorities publicly claimed that the vessel was on some sort
of spy mission, 5 7 a more plausible explanation for the Cambodian
conduct was proposed as early as May 13, 1975.1-18 A Cambodian
gunboat had stopped-and after a thorough search, released-a Panamanian ship on May 7 in the area where the Mayaguez was captured.
After the fall of Phnom Penh to the communists in April, refugees fled
the country in three Cambodian ships which ended up in the hands of
the United States Navy at Subic Bay in the Philippines. A reasonable
explanation for the Cambodian policy of detaining ships could be that
they were seeking an American prize with which to barter for the return
of the three ships held at Subic Bay.' 5 9
While the author does not know for certain why the Cambodians
thought it necessary to harass shipping in the Gulf of Thailand in early
May of 1975, the theory that the Mayaguez was seized for bargaining
purposes suggests that they were not completely oblivious to the possibility of negotiation for the ship's release. But administration policy
makers made no serious diplomatic attempts to secure the peaceful release of the ship and its crew. 160 Rather, the seizure was interpreted
as a direct challenge to our country's willingness to protect its interests.
At the first meeting of the National Security Council on May 12
the senior members of the council quickly agreed that this time the
United States would not allow itself to be maneuvered into the type of
situation which prevailed after the seizure of the spy ship Pueblo by the
North Koreans in 1969.161 A suggestion was made before the National
156. See, e.g., the concurring remarks of George Reedy, who served as special assistant and then press secretary to President Lyndon Johnson, in Hearings on S. 1125 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d
Cong., lst Sess. 464-66 (1971).
157. See Text of CambodianCommunique, N.Y. Times, May 16, 1975, at 15, col. 6.
158. See 121 CONG. REc. E 2379 (daily ed. May 13, 1975) reprinting Bradsher, Intelligence Blunder? DangerSigns Ignored, Washington Star, May 19, 1975, at 8, col. 4.
159. The vessel need not have been of United States registry as long as the seizure
could spark some diplomatic activity. An American owned ship flying a Panamanian
or the Liberian "flag of convenience" would be sufficient.
160. See text accompanying notes 144-49 supra. The Cambodians had at most 32
hours notice from the first demand for release on the afternoon of May 12 until the
first Cambodian gunboat was sunk by American war planes. It seems that every Cambodian vessel in the area was then attacked. This is hardly an atmosphere conducive
to diplomatic negotiation and compromise. See also note 154 supra, documenting the
avidity with which Secretaries Kissinger and Schlesinger approached the opportunity to
demonstrate President Ford's determination to show that America was still capable of
quick military response.
161. N.Y. Times, May 19, 1975, at 8, col. 4 (city ed.).
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Security Council (and immediately rejected by President Ford) that if
the CoralSea were somehow delayed on its way to the Gulf of Thailand,
B-52's should bomb targets in Cambodia "to frighten the Cambodian
Government away from making humiliating demands on Washington."' 2 The New York Times quoted "high ranking administration
sources" in its May 14 issue as viewing the seizure to be a welcome
opportunity for display of American determination in Southeast Asia
after the fall of the governments supported by the United States in Cambodia and South Vietnam. 163 While President Ford's report to Congress
attempted to justify the military operation solely by the necessity for
"rescue of the captured American crew along with the retaking of the
ship Mayaguez,"'6 4 when he addressed a North Atlantic Treaty Organization meeting in Brussels on May 23, Ford characterized the decision
to use combat forces in the Mayaguez affair as a "clear, clear indication
that we are not only strong but we have the will and the capability of
moving" to meet challenges. 1 5
Why Cambodia's "challenge" had to be met with immediate armed
force at the cost of fifteen American combat deaths is as unclear as the
nature of the challenge itself. A week after the marines landed on Koh
Tang some Mayaguez crewmen disclosed that the Cambodians had
offered to let Captain Miller and at least part of the crew return to the
Mayaguez for the purpose of radioing the Americans to call off the air
attacks. Captain Miller told a reporter that he turned down the offer
not only because he did not want to divide his crew members, but also
because any boat returning to the Mayaguez that night risked being
sunk by American planes.' 68 This report is further evidence that the
Cambodians were willing to negotiate for the release of the ship and its
crew as early as the night of the thirteenth,' 7 and that without the
administration's reaction the marine assault on Koh Tang and the air
attacks on the mainland might have been avoided entirely.
Speculation on what might have been is of limited value. The
president and his advisors made some attempts to effect a diplomatic
resolution, but the military response was stayed only until the Seventh
Fleet task force could reach the Gulf of Thailand preparatory to the
162. Id.
163. N.Y. Times, May 14, 1975, at 18, col. 2; see note 154 supra.
164. "Communication from the President of the United States," H.R. Doc. No. 151,
94th Cong., 19t Sess. (1975), reprinted in 121 CONG. REc. H 4080-81 (daily ed. May
15, 1975) [hereinafter cited as "Communication from the President of the United StatesJ.
165. N.Y. Times, May 24, 1975, at 1, col. 8.
166. N.Y. Times, May 21, 1975, at 16, col. 2.
167. See text accompanying notes 158-59 supra for a plausible explanation of why
the Mayaguez was seized in the first place, viz., to give the Cambodians leverage in possible negotiations with the United States for the release of the three Cambodian vessels
held at Subic Bay.
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It may be that even before this time American

attacks against Cambodian boats foreclosed the possiblity that the May16 8
aguez and its crew could be recovered without loss of American lives.

Analysis of the three day Mayaguez crisis, however, must go beyond a discussion of the wisdom of the particular tactics used to free the
ship and its crew to a discussion of the legal framework within which the
decision to use military force was made. Any war-making power the
president has in the absence of congressional authorization derives from

the Constitution. The War Powers Resolution of 1973 was intended to
refute the view, espoused by recent presidents, that the power of the
commander in chief is what the president defines it to be. 69 In the
words of Senator Javits, the floor leader and a chief sponsor of both
Senate Bill 440 and the final compromise, House Joint Resolution 542,
"[i]f this challenge is not met successfully by the Congress, I do not see
how it can prevent the further erosion of its powers."'7"
168. Lest it be thought that the seizure of American vessels is an extraordinary occurrence in the twentieth century, mention should be made of the continuing saga of
the United States tuna fleet and its difficulties with Latin American governments that
claim a 200 mile territorial sea limit. From 1961 (the first year that reliable records
were kept) through 1972, 175 United States tuna boats were seized for fishing without
a license in disputed waters, with Ecuador and Peru accounting for 164 of the seizures.
An official seizure occurs when a fishing boat is taken into port after being forcibly
boarded and detained. The total amount of fines and fees assessed against the tuna fleet
from 1961-72 was over five million dollars. The largest single fine was $157,740, imposed by Ecuador against the tuna clipper Apollo at the time of its second seizure. Ecuadorian officials warned the captain of the Apollo that his three million dollar clipper
would be confiscated outright if he were again caught fishing without a license within
the country's 200 mile claim area. Approximately 25 of the seizures involved gunfire,
causing property damage, at least one serious injury, and the obvious risk of explosion,
sinking and death. In 1969, the United States tuna boat San Juan took sixty rounds
of machine gunfire, suffering $50,000 damage, for defying an order from a Peruvian patrol boat to put into port.
Since the United States does not recognize claims for a 200 mile territorial sea,
these captures are naturally regarded as illegal. But not once have we resorted to armed
force to vindicate our position. Rather, our approach to the 200 mile claims dispute
and the resultant seizures has been a two decade attempt to settle the matter by quiet
diplomacy through proposals to allow an international organization, such as the World
Court, to arbitrate the matter, through direct negotiations with a group of the 200 mile
claimants, or through bilateral negotiations with the claimant country. For a detailed
explanation of the ongoing dispute over the 200 mile claims see B. SMETHERMAN & R.
SMETHERMAN, TERmRowTRAL SEAS AND INTER-AMERICAN RELAMONS 16-31 (1974). This
chapter documents the facts and episodes narrated above. While the author does not
contend that the legality of seizing a foreign vessel fishing in disputed waters is comparable to that of seizing a ship exercising the right of innocent passage through territorial
waters, it is obvious that the United States has shown a laudable capacity for diplomatic
response in the face of challenges similar to the Mayaguez seizure.
169. 119 CONG. REc. 33,549-51 (remarks of Senator Javits).
170. Hearingson War Powers,supra note 35, at 6.
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Unfortunately, Congress' immediate reaction to the Mayaguez seizure was an outpouring of uncritical clamor for quick military action. If
Cambodia would not release the ship within twenty-four hours, Representative Crane of Illinois suggested a "direct 'rifle shot' punitive attack
that would demonstrate to the Cambodians that it would not be worth
the cost to hold this U.S. vessel."' 171 Representative Young of Florida
seemed to suggest that Congress was incompetent to exercise its warmaking power: "We have appeased our adversaries until we are the
laughingstock of the world. . . . We have bound our Commander in
Chief with a War Powers Act that compels him to wait while the Congress dawdles, debates, restricts, and pontificates ... .7 Even Senator Case of New Jersey, a strong supporter of the War Powers Resolution, said that the president was acting within his authority to use force
as a "police action" to secure the release of the Mayaguez.""
Congressional response to President Ford's method of freeing the
Mayaguez was somewhat more critical. Senators McGovern of South
Dakota and Nelson of Wisconsin questioned the wisdom of military
action under circumstances where more emphasis should have been
placed on diplomatic initiative." 4 Representative Holtzman of New
York doubted the constitutionality of President Ford's action, 175 while
Representatives Seiberling of Ohio and Drinan of Massachusetts wondered how the unauthorized hostilities could be reconciled with the War
Powers Resolution. 176 Representative Broomfield of Michigan, however, declared that "the White House adhered scrupulously to the requirements of the War Powers Act," and that he was "very pleased with
the close and careful consultation the White House offered the Congress."'1 77 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee passed a resolution
which, while it never received the consideration of the full Senate, was
intended as a vote of senatorial confidence in the president's decision to
recover the Mayaguez by use of force. The committee resolved that
"we support the President in the exercise of his constitutional powers
within the framework of the War Powers Resolution to secure the
release of the ship and its men."' 8
President Ford announced in his May 15 report to Congress that
"[t]his operation was ordered and conducted pursuant to the Presi171. 121 CONG. Rac. H 3960 (daily ed. May 13, 1975).
172. 121 CONG. REc. H 4062 (daily ed. May 14, 1975).
173. N.Y. Times, May 13, 1975, at 19, col. 7.
174. 121 CONG. Rac. S. 8461-62 (daily ed. May 16, 1975).
175. 121 CoNG. Rac. H 4124 (daily ed. May 15, 1975).
176. 121 CONG. Rac. H 4214 (daily ed. May 19, 1975) (remarks of Representative Seiberling), and id. H 4560-61 (daily ed. May 21, 1975) (remarks of Representative
Drinan).
177. 121 CONG. REc.H 4080 (daily ed., May 15, 1975).
178. N.Y. Times, May 15, 1975, at 18, col. 7.
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dent's constitutional Executive power and his authority as Commanderin-Chief of the United States Armed Forces.' ' 17 1 Roderick Hills, counsel to the president, told reporters that Mr. Ford had acted under -his
constitutional war powers to protect the lives and property of Americans
abroad, and that while he could not cite the exact article and section of
the Constitution bestowing such power on the executive, the president's
inherent right to use forces for this purpose, he said ". . . had not been
challenged. The only open question was the appropriate level of mili180
tary response."'
Mr. Ford thus offered no specific authority for the proposition that
he could use the armed forces to rescue United States citizens without
prior authorization. In a similar situation in 1859 President James
Buchanan proceeded more cautiously. In a regular message to Congress of December 28, 1859, Buchanan found it necessary to:
.recommend to Congress that authority be given to the President to employ the naval force to protect American merchant vessels, their crews and cargoes, against violent and lawless seizure
and confiscation in the ports of Mexico and the Spanish American
States when these countries may be in a disturbed and revolutionary condition.
Congress possess the sole and exclusive power under the Constitution "to declare war." . . . But after Congress shall have declared war and provided the force necessary to carry it on the President, as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, can alone
employ this force in making war against the enemy.Y"
President Buchanan further recognized that Congress' power to
declare war was not confined to general wars, but extended to any
conflict, no matter how inconsequential or limited: "Without the authority of Congress the President can not fire a hostile gun in any case
except to repel the attacks of an 'enemy'.' 82 Whatever Gerald Ford
understood the constitutional powers of the commander in chief to be,
these powers are no more expansive now than they were in Buchanan's
time. The president remains the supreme military commander of the
armed forces, with the duty to defend the United States in the event of
sudden attack. The Constitution is clear that all other hostilities must
be specifically authorized by Congress. Despite the ambiguous language of the War Powers Resolution, it should not be construed as
enlarging the president's powers but rather as reaffirming the constitu179. "Communication from the President of the United States," supra note 164, at
H 4081.
180. N.Y. Times, May 15, 1975, at 18, col. 3.
181.

5 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, at 569 (J.Richardson,

ed. 1897).
182. Id. at 570.
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tional allocation of the power to declare war to the legislative branch
and the power to conduct war to the executive branch.
Obviously, the War Powers Resolution served as no more effective
a brake on unauthorized presidential war-making during the Mayaguez
episode than did the Constitution. The declaration of the scope of the
president's power as commander in chief in subsection 2(c)18 3 was
completely ignored. No possible reading of this language gives the president the power to rescue Americans abroad without congressional authorization. In fact, a Senate amendment which would have delegated
such power to the president was specifically rejected by the Committee
on Conference.'8 Mr. Ford complied with none of the applicable provisions of the War Powers Resolution save subsection 4(a), requiring that
a report to Congress be made within forty-eight hours of his use of
force.' s5 Section 3 requires that "[t]he President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United States
Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances . ... ",86
Senator favits, defending House Joint Resolution 542 before final passage against charges that it was not strict enough, explained that the
"statutory requirement of advance consultation as well as continuing
consultation with the Congress, is to be read as maximal rather than
minimal."' 17 The consultation section recognizes that sudden emergencies may arise which make it impossible for the president to consult
with Congress in advance, but in this case the president is still governed
by the declaration of authority in subsection 2(c). Javits also warned
that while consultation may lead to a declaration of war or some other
specific congressional authorization, it was no substitute for these formal
legislative measures.'
The Pentagon Answers indicate that the president held at least two
meetings with the National Security Council before ordering American
planes to prevent the movement of the Mayaguez,8 9 and that in two
further National Security Council meetings the decision was made to
send the marines onto Koh Tang and to launch air attacks against the
mainland.190 Yet congressional leaders were merely informed of decisions already made, and, in some cases, already implemented. 9 ' When
183. War Powers Resolution, § 2(c), 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (c) (Supp. 1973).
184. See text accompanying notes 103-10 supra.
185. War Powers Resolution, § 4(a), 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a) (Supp. 1973).
186. Id. § 3, 50 U.S.C. § 1542.
187. 119 CONG. REc. 33,550 (1973).
188. Id.
189. PENrAGow ANswEns, supra note 139 (answer to question number 1.).
190. Id.
191. See text accompanying notes 138-53 supra. Note 114 supra delineates the legislative intent behind the consultation requirement of subsection 2(c) of the War Powers
Resolution.
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questioned by reporters, congressional leaders, including Senators Mansfield, Case and Eastland, in addition to Representatives O'Neil and
Rhodes, had to admit that the president had not made the slightest

pretense of consulting them, but had merely told them what he intended
to do about the seizure. 192

Representative John Anderson of Illinois

was "disappointed" that the president had found it necessary to do no
more than inform a few selected congressmen of his decisions a few
hours before he notified the press. Anderson complained that the presi-

dent's approach "doesn't really fit the new era of divided responsibil-

ity."19 "Divided responsibility" is an odd way to characterize a constitutional scheme giving Congress almost plenary war powers; what the

words do point to is the continuing reluctance of Congress to take initiative in this area. The president was able to ignore the War Powers Reso-

lution because he could foresee that Congress itself would not hold him
to its dictates.194 The Senate Foreign Affairs Committee resolution sup-

porting the president "in the exercise of his constitutional powers within

the framework of the War Powers Resolution,"' 9 5 made it clear that
even members of the committee which had labored three years to draft

and dnact into law effective war powers legislation would not insist that
the law be complied with.
After Mayaguez
Troubled by the fact that President Ford ignored both Congress
and the War Powers Resolution in the Mayaguez episode, Senator
Eagleton quickly proposed three amendments to rectify the situation. 196
The first amendment to the War Powers Resolution would declare that
the president has the right to rescue endangered citizens even in the

absence of any congressional authorization.' 97

In effect this amend-

ment would avoid future embarrassment of Congress by granting the
president the authority to proceed as President Ford did in the Maya192. See N.Y. Times, May 15, 1975, at 18, cols. 4-6 city ed.
193. Id. at col. 4.
194. Although President Ford did report to Congress within forty-eight hours of ordering the armed forces into combat, even here he explained that he was doing this "fiun
accordance with my desire that the Congress be informed on this matter and taking note
of Section 4(a) (1) of the War Powers Resolution...." "Communication from the
President of the United States," supra note 159. By merely "taking note" of the reporting requirement was the president implying that he considered the War Powers Resolution to be no more binding on him than, for example, a resolution expressing the "sense
of the Senate"?
195. N.Y. Times, May 15, 1975, at 18, col. 7. Fairness to Senator McGovern requires that the New York Times report that the committee vote was unanimous, id., be
balanced against the senator's claim that he had "never at any time approved the
handling of this matter." 121 CONo. REc.S 8461 (daily ed. May 16, 1975).
196. 121 CONG. Rc. S.8825-27 (daily ed. May 21, 1975).
197. S. 1790, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1975).
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guez episode. It would delegate Congress' power relative to such
incidents while requiring that the evacuation take place "as expeditiously as possible and with a minimum of force."'198 The second amendment would replace the phrase "consult with Congress" in section 3 with
the words "seek the advice and counsel of Congress."' 99 Senator
Eagleton hopes that this amendment will assure that "Congress [sic]
view will be represented and considered prior to the introduction of
forces."2 °0 The final amendment, by enlarging the definition of "members of the Armed Forces of the United States," would apply the War
Powers Resolution to the use of civilian combatants, such as American
mercenaries
directed by the C.I.A., as well as to the United States
201
military.
It may be wise for Congress to delegate to the president a carefully
defined power to rescue endangered citizens since it has demonstrated
that it wants no part of a decision to use force if such measures become
necessary. The second proposed amendment, on the other hand, seems
positively otiose. Would President Ford have acted any differently had
this amendment been law when the Mayaguez events took place? He
might have gone into a bit more detail on his reasons for using the
marines, but, given the lack of initiative of Congress, the final decision
would surely have been the same. The Eagleton amendments say
nothing at all about who shall make the all important decision to declare
war or remain at peace.
Former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger recently announced that
NATO forces are prepared to make first use of theater or battlefield
nuclear weapons to avoid a defeat in Europe by Warsaw Pact conventional forces. "The attacks should be delivered," said Schlesinger,
"with sufficient shock and decisiveness to forcibly change the perceptions of the Warsaw Pact leaders and create a situation conducive to
negotiations. 20 2 This threat has been neither repudiated nor qualified
by the president, nor has it been challenged by Congress. A preemptive
nuclear strike would almost certainly cause retaliation and escalation
resulting in the utter destruction of both antagonists. The need for
congressional reassertion of its war-making prerogative has never been
more pressing, but neither the War Powers Resolution nor the proposed
Eagleton amendments are equal to the task. In referring to Mr. Ford's
management of the Mayaguez incident, one Congressman said that
"It]he President's action has broad support because it was quick,
sure, and above all, successful. I wonder what would now be said had it
198.
199.
200.
201.

121 CONG. REc. S 8826 (daily ed. May 21, 1975).
S. 1790, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1975).
121 CONG. REC. S 8826 (daily ed. May 21, 1975).
S. 1790, 94th Cong., lst Sess. § 3 (1975).
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turned out differently." 20 3 This expresses the present situation exactly,
and indicates that little has changed since 1968 when Professor Kurland
wrote that:
We are prepared, according to our loyalties, to back a President that we admire and condemn the one that we dislike, when
what we should be doing is to recognize the wisdom of the Constitutional provisions that would preclude the unlimited exercise of
power that we have witnessed by each of our recent chief executives and the unalloyed cowardice of the Congress
in allowing such
204
arrogation of power to the executive branch.
Only Congress can prevent the war powers from passing irrevocably to the executive branch. If it continues to neglect its responsibility in
the sorry fashion of Mayaguez, by not demanding that the decision to
use armed forces be made only by vote of the two houses in Congress
assembled, no president will hesitate to conduct an unconstitutional war,
as long as he thinks that his use of force will be quick, sure, and successful. But the Constitution requires that Congress make the decision, not
the president and his anonymous National Security Council. The decision to use the armed forces must be subjected to the closest congressional scrutiny, with every opinion receiving a full hearing. This method
does not ensure the wisdom of the ultimate decision, but if we are to
preserve our constitutional form of government it is the only way we
may go to war.

203. 121 CONG. REC. H 4570 (daily ed. May 21, 1975) (remarks of Representative
Duncan).
204. Kurland, The Impotence of Reticence, 1968 DuKE L.J. 619, 624.

